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Abstract
The financial sustainability of public pension requires the reserve should be positive
to pay the benefit in the demographic and economical environment change subject to the
certain level of the income replacement ratio. Assuming the market asset and the income
for pension follows Ito processes and we maximize the net present value of pension for the
cohort, To guarantee the pension fund sustainability, we apply the martingale method of
the optimal consumption and investment theory. We use the age-structured model to the
pension population change.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Risk management for a public pension
Welfare nations have been suffering the robust management of public pension as seen the reform
in [4] and [5]. Japanese government has announced every five years the actuarial valuation of
pension plan for 100 years, as seen [6]. It reviewed the long term financial viability under signif-
icant changes in the demographic and economical environment. The financial viability implies
that the reserve of pension fund should be positive, under the $co$ndition that the replacement
ratio is more the 50 %, which means that the average amount of pension is more than the average
income of contributors.
The aging society with the low birth rate makes worse the balance of pension account in the
near future with the prolonged deflationary economy in Japan.
Economic scenarios for the simulation are the rate of return of investment, the wage as the
key factor of contribution and benefit, and inflation rate and interest rate.
The total pension fund was 144.4 trillion yen at 2009 and has decreased to 120 trillion at
2012. There exists the ambiguity in population projection by Government survey [6] as Table
1.1. Figurel.1 is the governmental projections of populations of pension.
The long term economic scenarios were assumed as Tablel.1. In 2004 the government reform
plan had set the maximum premium rate as 18.3% and benefit cutoff by the rate of decreasing
contributors and aging rate. Their plan starts from 2012 and will end 2038.
1.2 $A$ portfolio formulation for pension risk management
The objective satisfies the following considerations; 1) to minimize the government subsidy
to pension fund, 2) to maximize the net present value of pension premium and benefit, 3) to
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Table 1: Population projections
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Figure 1: contributors $(-)$ and beneficiaries $($—$)$
minimize the difference among generations in the net values, 4) to perform income redistribution
to the poor elderly.
The constraints are followings; 1) no default of pension system for 100 years, 2) The reserve
fund at the end of plan should be enough to continue the system. 3) The income replacement
ratio should be more than 50%.
2 The model
2.1 Policyholders
Let $p(t, y)$ denote the numbers of policyholders of the age $y$ at $t$ and $\omega_{1}$ the starting age of
paying premium, $\omega_{2}$ the end age and starting of receiving benefit $\omega_{3}$ the end age of beneficiary.
Table 2: Economic scenarios of 100 years
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The total number of contributors satisfies:
$\xi_{t}^{1}=\int_{\omega_{1}}^{\omega}2p(t, y)dy$ (2.1)
The total number of beneficiaries:
$\xi_{t}^{2}=\int_{\omega 2}^{\omega 3}p(t, y)dy$ (2.2)
The balance of total premium and benefit is assumed to be based on the average wage. Let
$H_{t}$ denote the average wage at $t$ and $a_{t}$ be the rate of premium. Let $u_{t}$ be the total premium
amount at $t$ ;
$u_{t}:=a_{t}H_{t}\xi_{t}^{1}$
Let $b_{t}$ be the benefit ratio to the average wage and $s_{t}$ be the total benefit amount;
$s_{t}:=b_{t}H_{t}\xi_{t}^{2}.$
We assume that $a_{t},$ $b_{t}$ is predictable process and it satisfies self-finance strategies, which are in
the condition of $0<a_{t},$ $b_{t}<1$ . The balance of premium and benefit $q_{t}(a, b)H_{t}$ is defined as:
$u_{t}-s_{t}=(a_{t}\xi_{t}^{1}-b_{t}\xi_{t}^{2})H_{t}=:q_{t}(a, b)H_{t}.$
2.2 The portfolio
The pension portfolio consists of three assets; Market asset price satisfies the following It\^o
process:
$dA_{t}/A_{t}=\mu_{r}(t)dt+\sigma_{r}(t)dW_{t}^{r}=:dr_{t},$
Human capital price(wage) process satisfies:
$dH_{t}/H_{t}=\mu_{x}(t)dt+\sigma_{x}(t)dW_{t}^{x}=:dx_{t},$
The risk free rate $r$ and the money market account $e^{rt}.$
Portfolio strategies of the pension fund are denoted as $\pi_{t}:=(\phi_{t}, a_{t}, b_{t},\beta_{t})$ ; Let $\phi_{t}$ denote the
investment amount of market asset, $(a_{t}, b_{t})$ denote the strategies for the human capital which
means the policy of pension. Let $\beta_{t}>0$ denote the government subsidy to pension fund at $t$
and $R_{t}$ denote the value of pension fund at $t.$
The portfolio value satisfies at $t$ :
$R_{t}=\phi_{t}A_{t}+q(a, b)H_{t}$ (2.3)
The dynamics of fund is due to the predictability of strategies $(\phi_{t}, \beta_{t})$ :
$dR_{t}=\phi_{t}dA_{t}+d(q(a, b)H_{t})+\beta_{t}dt, R_{0}=\overline{R}$ (2.4)
The population dynamics is assumed to be non stochastic but not satisfies self financing
condition then the dynamics of the balance of premium and benefit of pension is as follows,
$d(q(a, b)H_{t}) = a_{t}(d\xi_{t}^{1}H_{t}+\xi_{t}^{1}dH_{t})-b_{t}(d\xi_{t}^{2}H_{t}+\xi_{t}^{2}dH_{t})$
$= (a_{t}\xi_{t}^{1}-b_{t}\xi_{t}^{2})dH_{t}+(a_{t}d\xi_{t}^{1}-b_{t}d\xi_{t}^{2})H_{t}$
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Let define the change of balance due to change of numbers of contributors and beneficiaries;
$dq(a, b)$ $:=a_{t}d\xi_{t}^{1}-b_{t}d\xi_{t}^{2}$ , then
$d(q(a, b)H_{t})=q(a, b)dH_{t}+dq(a, b)H_{t}.$
Subsitute it to (2.4) then
$dR_{t}=\phi_{t}A_{t}dr_{t}+q(a, b)H_{t}dx_{t}+dq(a, b)H_{t}+\beta_{t}dt.$
By using (2.3) we obtain:
$dR_{t}=R_{t}dr_{t}+q(a, b)H_{t}(dx_{t}-dr_{t})+dq(a, b)H_{t}+\beta_{t}dt.$
From (2.1) and(2.2),
$dq(a, b) = a_{t}d\xi_{t}^{1}-b_{t}d\xi_{t}^{2}$
$= \{a_{t}\int_{\omega_{1}}^{\omega_{2}^{-}}\frac{\partial p(t,y)}{\partial t}dy-b_{t}\int_{\omega_{2}}^{\omega_{3}}\frac{\partial p(t,y)}{\partial t}dy\}dt$
From the PDE of McKendrick-von Foerster
$\frac{\partial p(t,y)}{\partial t}=-\frac{\partial p(t,y)}{\partial y}-\mu(t, y)p(t, y)$ , (2.5)
where $\mu(t, y)$ is decreasing speed of pension participant at $t$ of the age $y.$
2.3 The cohort modeling
We use the method of characteristics in PDE which equals to use the cohort model of population.
Let $t=k+y$ and assume $\mu(y)=\mu(t, y)$ which means the decreasing number depends only
the age. Let $v(k, y)$ $:=p(t, k)$ then From (2.5) we get:
$dv(k, y)=-\mu(y)v(k, y)dy.$
and the solution is
$v(k, y)=v(k, 0) \exp(\int_{0}^{y}\mu(s)ds)$
In Figure 2.3 is seen the cohort model in a public pension plan for 100 years horizon and the
ages of contribution $(\omega_{1}, \omega_{2})$ and benefit $(\omega_{2}, \omega_{3})$ . The change of contributor is from (2.1):
$d \xi_{t}^{1} = -\int_{\omega_{1}}^{\omega_{2}^{-}}\mu(y)v(k, y)dy,$
and the change of beneficiaries is similarily:
$d \xi_{t}^{2} = -\int_{\omega_{2}}^{\omega_{3}}\mu(y)v(k, y)dy.$
Thus the change of pension balance satisfies ;
$dq_{t}(a, b)H_{t} = (a_{t}d\xi_{t}^{1}-b_{t}d\xi_{t}^{2})H_{t}$
$= -(a_{k+y} \int_{\omega_{1}}^{\omega_{2}^{-}}\mu(y)v(k, y)dy-b_{k+y}\int_{\omega}^{\omega_{3}}2\mu(y)v(k, y))H_{t}$ , (2.6)




Figure 2: Cohorts and 100 year pension plan
3 The pension strategies
3.1 The present value of pension for a cohort
For the time horizon from $0$ to $T$ there are $k$ cohort of $0\leq k\leq T_{l}$ $:=T-(\omega_{3}-\omega_{1})$ who are their
all contributions and benefits are within the planning period. These cohorts are new comers to
the pension.
$c(k) :=- \int_{\omega_{1}}^{\omega_{2}^{-}}a_{y+k}H_{y+k}^{*}v(k, y)dy+\int_{\omega}^{\omega_{3}}2b_{y+k}H_{y+k}^{*}v(k, y)dy$ (3.1)
For existing pensionaries $(-\omega_{3}<k<0)$ , their premium and benefit was decided as $a_{c}$ and
$b_{c}$ for the past $:y+k<0$ ; They will follow the new premium and benefit from now $y+k\geq 0.$
The net present value $c_{e}(k)$ should be positive;
$c_{e}(k)=- \int_{\omega}^{\omega_{2}^{-}}1(a_{c}1_{\{y+k<0\}}+a_{y+k}1_{\{y+k\geq 0\}})H_{y+k}^{*}v(k, y)dy$
$+ \int_{\omega}^{\omega 3}2(b_{c}1_{\{y+k<0\}}+b_{y+k}1_{\{y+k\geq 0\}})H_{y+k}^{*}v(k, y)dy$ . (3.2)
For the future cohort $(T_{l}<k<T)$ whose benefit will not finished before $T$ , their net present
value $c_{p}(k)$ should be positive;
$c_{p}(k)=- \int_{\omega_{1}}^{\omega_{2}^{-}}(a_{k+y}1_{\{y+k<T\}}+\tilde{a}_{y+k}1_{\{y+k\geq T\}})H_{y+k}^{*}v(k, y)dy$
$+ \int_{\omega}^{\omega_{3}}2(b_{y+k}1_{\{y+k<T\}}+\tilde{b}_{y+k}1_{\{y+k\geq T\}})H_{y+k}^{*}v(k, y)dy$. (3.3)




3.2 The optimal problem of public pension
The objective function is to maximize the utility function of the new pension participant who
are the cohort of $0\leq k\leq T_{l}$ , where $U_{1}$ $(.$ $)$ is a utility function for present value of pension and
$U_{2}(\cdot)$ is the utility of fund value at $T$ :
$\max_{\pi_{t}}E[\int_{0}^{T_{l}}U_{1}(c(k)dk+U_{2}(R_{T})]$
Beside constraints (3.2) and (3.3), we impose the following constraints seen in [5];
(1) No default of pension fund, which should satisfies the following;
$R_{t}>0 \forall t\in[0, T],$
(2) Government subsidy $\gamma_{t}$ should be within the limitation;
$E^{Q}[ \int_{t}^{T}e^{-rs}\beta_{s}ds|\mathcal{F}_{t}]\leq\gamma_{t}.$
At the planning time it is as follows;
$E^{Q}[ \int_{0}^{T}e^{-rs}\beta_{s}ds]\leq\gamma_{0}$
(3) The economic rationality to hold the pension;
For the existing policyholders;
$E^{Q}[c_{e}(k)]>0, k\in(-\omega_{3},0)$
For the future policyholders;
$E^{Q}[c_{p}(k)]>0, k>T-(\omega_{3}-\omega_{1})$
4 Pension portfolio process under the risk neutral probability
4.1 Martingale method for the risk management
The risk management of pension should be no default which implies that $R_{t}>0$ for all $t\in(0, T)$ .
It can be treated by the martingale method of optimal investment and consumption problem of
Dana-Jeanblanc $[2],ppl37-144.$
Let $e^{rt}$ a numeraire, from (2.3) and (2.4)
$dR_{t}e^{-rt}-R_{t}re^{-rt}dt=(\phi_{t}dA_{t}+q(a, b)dH_{t}+dq(a, b)H_{t}+\beta_{t}dt)e^{-rt}-(\phi_{t}A_{t}+q(a, b)H_{t})re^{-rt}(4.1)$
Then
$d(R_{t}/e^{rt})=\phi_{t}d(A_{t}/e^{rt})+q(a, b)d(H_{t}/e^{rt})+dq(a, b)H_{t}e^{-rt}+\beta_{t}e^{-rt}dt$
Let denote $R_{t}^{*}:=R_{t}/e^{rt},$ $A_{t}^{*}=A_{t}/e^{rt},$ $H_{t}^{*}=H_{t}/e^{rt}$ , then
$dR_{t}^{*}=\phi_{t}dA_{t}^{*}+q(a, b)dH_{t}^{*}+dq(a, b)H_{t}^{*}+\beta_{t}e^{-rt}dt$
The reserve fund at $T$ becomes as follows:
$R_{T}^{*}=R_{0}+ \int_{0}^{T}\phi_{t}dA_{t}^{*}+\int_{0}^{T}q(a, b)dH_{t}^{*}+\int_{0}^{T}H_{t}^{*}dq(a, b)+\int_{0}^{T}\beta_{t}e^{-rt}dt$, (4.2)
where $H_{t}^{*}$ and $A_{t}^{*}$ are martingales under the risk neutral measure $Q.$
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4.2 The admissible strategies
The admissible strategies satisfying the constraint $R_{t}>0$ as Dana et al [2]. We assume that
the government subsidy to the pension fund should satisfies $E^{Q[} \int_{t}^{T}\beta_{s}ds+\int_{t}^{T}H_{s}dq(a, b)]\leq 0.$
It is the assumption that the government subsidy is less than the deficit due to the population
change of the aging with low fertility. Another assumption which is taken from Japanese pension
report is that the final reserve fund covers the pension benefit;
$R_{T}=H_{T}b_{t}\xi_{t}^{2}$ (4.3)
From (4.2)
$R_{t}^{*}- \int_{0}^{t}H_{s}^{*}dq(a, b)-\int_{0}^{t}\beta_{t}e^{-rs}ds=R_{0}+\int_{0}^{t}\phi_{s}dA_{s}^{*}+\int_{0}^{t}q(a, b)dH_{s}^{*}=:M_{t}$ (4.4)
$M_{t}$ is a positive $Q$-martingale which is under the risk neutral probability. Then
$R_{t}^{*}=M_{t}+ \int_{0}^{t}H_{s}^{*}dq(a, b)+\int_{0}^{t}\beta_{t}e^{-rs}ds$ (4.5)




From the assumption $E^{Q[} \int_{t}^{T}\beta_{s}ds+\int_{t}^{T}H_{s}dq(a, b)]\leq 0.$ $H_{t}^{*}$ is $Q$-martingale then $E^{Q}[H_{T}^{*}]=$
$H_{0}>0$ . Therefore the the terminal reserve $E^{Q}[R_{T}^{*}]>0$ by (4.3). From these two conditions
$R_{t}>0, \forall t\in(0, T)$
and
$E^{Q}[R_{?}^{*}- \int_{0}^{T}H_{s}^{*}dq(a, b)]\leq B_{4}+\gamma 0$
We restate the above as the following theorem;
Theorem 1 if $E^{Q[} \int_{t}^{T}\beta_{s}ds+\int_{t}^{T}H_{s}dq(a, b)]\leq 0$ and if the final reserve satisfies $(4\cdot 3)$ , then
$R_{t}>0, \forall t\in(0, T)$
4.3 The optimal problem
From the consequence of (4.3), set the objective function as
$\max_{\pi_{t}}E[\int_{0}^{T_{l}}U_{1}(c(k))dk].$
The first constant is
$E^{Q}[l^{T}\beta_{s}ds+l^{T}H_{s}dq(a, b)]\leq 0.$
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The second one is
$E^{Q}[R_{T}^{*}- \int_{0}^{T}H_{s}^{*}dq(a, b)]\leq R_{0}+\gamma_{0}.$
Define the Radon-Nikodim derivative for the risk neutral measure: $L_{t}=dQ/dP|_{\mathcal{F}_{t}}$ then the
constraint becomes under the original probability measure;
$E[L_{T}R_{T}^{*}- \int_{0}^{T}L_{t}H_{s}^{*}dq(a, b)]\leq R_{0}+\gamma_{0}$
The third constraints are For the existing policyholders;
$E^{Q}[c_{e}(k)]>0, k\in(-\omega_{3},0)$
For the future policyholders;
$E^{Q}[c_{p}(k)]>0, k>T-(\omega_{3}-\omega_{1})$
This optimal problem will be solved in discretized version.
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